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Exercise Clause and Religion-Based
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During the trial of Ralph Clemmons, the prosecutor moved to
strike a venireman named Balhandra Das, who was dark
skinned.' Clemmons's attorney, consistent with the Supreme
Court's holding in Batson v Kentucky that striking a venireman
on account of his race violates the Equal Protection Clause,2
requested a race-neutral explanation for the strike. The prosecutor responded that he thought Das was of Asian-Indian descent,
which meant that Das was probably Hindu, and that "Hindus
tend.., to have feelings a good bit different from ours.... [He]
may have religious beliefs that may affect his thinking."3 The
court agreed that this explanation was sufficiently race-neutral
under Batson, and it allowed the challenge. The court did not,
however, consider the constitutionality of the challenge to the
extent it was based on Das's religion.
In the decade since the Supreme Court handed down its
decision in Batson, courts have struggled to determine the constitutionally permissible scope of peremptory challenges. Recently,
in J.E.B. v Alabama ex rel T.B., the Supreme Court held that
peremptory challenges based on gender also violate the Equal
Protection Clause.4 More than any previous decision, J.E.B.
evinces the Supreme Court's view that racial discrimination is
not unique and that other forms of discrimination are also invidious and deserving of eradication.
After J.E.B., however, the Supreme Court denied certiorari
in State v Davis, a case in which the Minnesota Supreme Court
had ruled that the Equal Protection Clause did not prohibit
peremptory challenges based on religion.5 Before Davis, many

t B-A 1993, University of Michigan; J.D. Candidate 1996, The University of Chicago.
' United States v Clemmons, 892 F2d 1153, 1155-56 (3d Cir 1989).
2 476 US 79, 97-98 (1986).
' Clemmons, 892 F2d at 1156.
4 114 S Ct 1419, 1422 (1994).

5 504 NW2d 767, 770-71 (Minn 1993), cert denied 114 S Ct 2120 (1994).
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jurists and legal commentators had predicted that once the Supreme Court extended Batson to classifications other than race,
the Court would slide down a slippery slope, eventually forbidding all peremptory challenges. 6 Justice Thomas dissented from
the denial of certiorari, arguing that he saw no principled reason
for declining to apply Batson to any peremptory challenge based
on a classification accorded heightened scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause. He ultimately concluded that the Court should
remand the case so that the Minnesota courts could explicitly
consider whether a principled distinction between religion and
gender exists.'
This Comment addresses the question raised by Justice
Thomas: whether there is indeed a distinction between religion,
on the one hand, and race and gender, on the other, for purposes
of peremptory challenges. In J.E.B., the Supreme Court said that
when a peremptory challenge is used to remove a member of a
suspect class, the challenge must have "an exceedingly persuasive justification" that "furthers the State's legitimate interest in
achieving a fair and impartial trial."' Since religion, unlike race
and gender, is based upon a system of beliefs, at least one court
has maintained that religion is distinguishable from race and
gender, and that permitting religion-based peremptory challenges
does in fact serve that interest.9 In order to truly resolve this
issue, one must look at available social-scientific data to determine if religion actually is an accurate predictor of potential
jurors' sympathies and prejudices (and therefore a permissible
basis for the exercise of peremptory challenges). A close examination of this data, however, reveals little, if any, support for the
notion that religious affiliation alone is an accurate predictor of
how a prospective juror will decide the merits of a case. Therefore, religion-based peremptory challenges do not serve the
state's interest in providing a fair and impartial jury any more
than peremptory challenges based upon race and gender do.

6

See Georgia v McCollum, 505 US 42, 60-62 (1992) (Thomas concurring) (arguing

that the Court's constitutional restriction of peremptory challenges "inexorably will lead
to the elimination of peremptory strikes"); Mark Curriden, The Death of the Peremptory
Challenge, 80 ABA J 62, 65 (Jan 1994) ("[lit may take some deft maneuvering to justify
not applying Batson to other categories that are subject to equal protection, notably age
and religion.").
Davis, 114 S Ct at 2120-22 (Thomas dissenting).
' 114 S Ct at 1425, quoting Personnel Administrator v Feeney, 442 US 256, 273
(1979).
s See Casarez v State, 913 SW2d 468, 494-95 (Tex Crim App 1995).
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Extending Batson to another protected suspect class, however, would not sound the death knell for all peremptory challenges. First, the abolition of religion-based peremptory challenges
would not in any way affect the status of challenges based on
classifications that are not subject to heightened scrutiny under
the Equal Protection Clause. Second, to be consistent with the
social-scientific data on this topic, this Comment proposes a fairly
limited protection: although courts should bar challenges based
solely on a venireman's religious affiliation, they should continue
to permit challenges based on his actual beliefs, even when those
beliefs spring from the venireman's religion.
Part I of this Comment discusses the jury selection process
and the use of peremptory challenges. Part II discusses the
Supreme Court's decision in Batson, the subsequent decisions
developing and expanding the equal protection rights of veniremen, and the emerging case law on religion-based strikes in the
lower courts. Part IlI proposes a framework for examining peremptory challenges under both the Equal Protection Clause and
the Free Exercise Clause. After concluding that religion-based
peremptory challenges should receive strict scrutiny, this Comment examines social science research to assess whether there is
any support for the notion that religion-based peremptory challenges help achieve impartial juries. Because the support for this
notion is weak, this Part concludes that such challenges fail to
pass strict scrutiny analysis. Finally, Part IV urges the adoption
of a regime that prohibits challenges grounded solely on stereotypes about religious affiliation, but that allows those grounded
on prospective jurors' particular beliefs. °
I. THE SELECTION OF A JURY
After a group of potential jurors, or veniremen, is assigned to
a courtroom, the parties begin the process of selecting the jurors
who will hear the trial. Parties can eliminate prospective jurors
through two mechanisms: challenges for cause and peremptory
challenges. Each party is generally given an unlimited number of
challenges for cause, but such challenges are allowed only at the
discretion of the judge. Allowable grounds for a challenge for

Although this Comment's principal focus is the constitutionality of religion-based
peremptory challenges in the criminal context, the arguments should apply to civil cases
as well. See Edmonson v Leesville Concrete Co., 500 US 614, 629-31 (1991) (holding that
race-based peremptory challenges pose the same constitutional problem in the civil
context as in the criminal).
10
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cause are generally circumscribed by statute, and typically include previous jury service on a related case, prior or potential
testimony as a witness against the defendant, and relation to the
defendant or another significant party to the litigation, in addition to the more general ground of lack of impartiality."
While challenges for cause can only be used in a fairly limited number of situations, "[tihe peremptory challenge permits a
party to excuse a juror for any reason that the party sees fit, or
for no reason at all."' Peremptory challenges are designed to be
used any time a party perceives a prospective juror to be ill suited to sit on the jury. They are generally used when litigants
cannot state a compelling reason for the dismissal of a particular
venireman.' In contrast to challenges for cause, the number of
peremptory challenges a party receives is usually fixed by statute. Today, most states provide the defendant with twenty for
offenses punishable by death or life imprisonment, ten for other
felonies, and three for misdemeanors.14 Most states give the
prosecution a number equal to those granted to the defendant,
but some give the prosecution fewer than the defendant. 5
Peremptory challenges serve a number of important interests. First, peremptory challenges can correct, instantly and easily, a judge's erroneous decision to refuse to grant a party's challenge for cause. By correcting a judge's possible error, peremptory
challenges save time and resources by eliminating the need for
an appeal and possible retrial. 6 Second, peremptory challenges
allow litigants to remove veniremen who litigants suspect are

" Yale Kamisar, Wayne R. LaFave, and Jerold H. Israel, Modern CriminalProcedure
1410-11 (West 8th ed 1994).
12 James J. Gobert and Walter E. Jordan, Jury Selection: The Law, Art, and Science
of Selecting a Jury § 8.01 at 269 (McGraw-Hill 2d ed 1990).
"s See, for example, Hayes v Missouri, 120 US 68, 70 (1887) ("The public prosecutor
may have the strongest reasons to distrust the character of a juror offered... and yet
find it difficult to formulate and sustain a legal objection to him. In such cases, the
peremptory challenge is protection against his being accepted.").
14 Kamisar, LaFave, and Israel, Modern Criminal Procedure at 1428 (cited in note

11).

15 Id.
16 See Ross v Oklahoma, 487 US 81, 88 (1988) (holding that erroneous denial by trial

court of a challenge for cause does not require reversal where the defendant used one of
his peremptory challenges to exclude the juror); James J. Gobert, The Peremptory Challenge-An Obituary, 1989 Crm L Rev 528, 529 ("[Ihe challenge provides a ready corrective for errors by a trial judge in refusing to grant a challenge for cause."). See also
Charles J. Morton, Jr., Peremptory Challenges:Are Their Days Numbered?, 24 Md B J 32,
32 (Nov/Dec 1991) ("Through peremptory challenges, attorneys, and their clients, have
been able to strike a finite number of potential jurors for reasons which, as a matter of
right, need never be explained or questioned by the court or their opponents.").
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unsuitable, but who do not appear to be sufficiently biased during
voir dire to justify removal for cause. Jurors themselves may be
unaware of their biases or may be reluctant to reveal unpopular
personal prejudices or predispositions.' 7 Third, because peremptory challenges require no explanation, an attorney can dismiss a
juror without having to ask the juror probing, embarrassing
questions during voir dire. 8 Relatedly, without peremptory challenges, a lawyer might be deterred from asking such questions
even if he feels them necessary, out of concern that any resulting
hostility on the part of the venireman could not be remedied by a
peremptory strike. 9 Finally, when litigants are able to use peremptory challenges, both parties are more likely to find a jury
verdict legitimate. Peremptory strikes enhance each party's control over the composition of the jury, leaving less room for
postverdict complaints about unfairness. 0
Much of the value of peremptory challenges, however, depends on the ability of the parties to inquire into the veniremen's
beliefs during voir dire. Although the Supreme Court has
guaranteed defendants the right to make certain inquiries into
racial bias,2 ' there is as yet no acknowledged right to make religious inquiries during voir dire. Nonetheless, trial courts are
charged with ferreting out potential bias, and they have very
broad discretion in determining how best to conduct voir dire. 2
A typical test for determining whether a court has adequately
questioned prospective jurors regarding bias is "whether the
means employed to test impartiality have created a reasonable assurance that prejudice would be discovered if present."'m Because
1

Is

Gobert, 1989 Crim L Rev at 529 (cited in note 16).
V. Hale Star and Mark McCormick, Jury Selection: An Attorney's Guide to Jury

Law & Methods § 11.4.3 at 458 (Little, Brown 2d ed 1993) ("[Tjhe challenge allows the
attorney to avoid interrogating persons whom he or she feels fit common stereotypes.").
" As the Fourth Circuit stated in United States v Hamilton: "Peremptory challenges
enable 'counsel to ascertain the possibility of bias through probing questions on the voir
dire and... [facilitate] the exercise of challenges for cause by removing the fear of incurring a juror's hostility through examination and challenge for cause." 850 F2d 1038,
1042 (4th Cir 1988), quoting Swain v Alabama, 380 US 202, 219-20 (1965).
Gobert, 1989 Crim L Rev at 529 (cited in note 16).
21 See Ham v South Carolina,409 US 524, 526-27 (1973) (concluding that whenever
racial matters are inextricably involved, a defendant is entitled to question the veniremen
as to their racial biases); Turner v Murray, 476 US 28, 36-37 (1986) (holding that capital
defendants accused of interracial crimes are entitled to have prospective jurors questioned
as to their racial biases).
' Rosales-Lopez v United States, 451 US 182, 189 (1981) ("[Flederal judges have been
accorded ample discretion in determining how best to conduct the voir dire."); FRCrP
24(a) (giving the trial court broad discretion to conduct voir dire itself or to let the parties
do it).
' United States v Saimiento-Rozo, 676 F2d 146, 148 (5th Cir 1982). See also State v
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the guidelines are broad, courts enjoy a great deal of latitude in
deciding what inquiries into veniremen's religious beliefs they
will permit.' In the current framework, as we will shortly see,
religious inquiry during voir dire appears to be a common occurrence, 25 and it merits constitutional scrutiny.
II. PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES AND THE CONSTITUTION
Although the Supreme Court has opened the dike by recognizing the equal protection dimensions of race- and gender-based
peremptory challenges, it has not yet directly addressed the constitutionality of religion-based challenges. Such challenges have,
however, come under increasing constitutional scrutiny in the
lower courts.
A. The Early Years
The Supreme Court first addressed the constitutionality of
race-based peremptory challenges in Swain v Alabama.6 In
Swain, the Court held that purposefully denying blacks the opportunity to participate as jurors on account of their race violated
the Equal Protection Clause." However, the Court severely limited the instances in which a defendant could claim that a
prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges had been discriminatory. Under Swain, unless the prosecutor admitted outright that he
had struck someone who was black solely on account of race, a
defendant had to demonstrate systematic exclusion of blacks
from the venire. This essentially required a defendant to compile

Bishop, 753 P2d 439, 448 (Utah 1988) ("[WI]hether the trial court abused its discretion in
conducting voir dire turns on whether, considering the totality of the questioning, counsel
was afforded an adequate opportunity to gain the information necessary to evaluate
jurors.").
24 See, for example, Congregationof the Passion v Touche Ross & Co., 159 Ill 2d 137,
636 NE2d 503, 516, cert denied, 115 S Ct 358 (1994) (holding that where the defendants
were accused of negligently preparing financial statements for a religious corporation, it
was within the trial court's discretion to refuse the defendants' request to ask jurors about
their contributions to the Catholic Church); State v Wright, 619 SW2d 822, 825 (Mo Ct
App 1981) (holding that the defendant was not entitled to make inquiries during voir dire
concerning prejudices that veniremen might have about the defendant's religion where the
defendant's Muslim religion was not at issue in the burglary prosecution); Riley v State,
496 A2d 997, 1006-07 (Del 1985) (ruling that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
refusing to comply with the defendant's request to ask jurors if they were Roman Catholic, after the Catholic Church gave the victim's family significant amounts of aid).
' See Section II.D.
26 380 US 202 (1965).
21

Id at 203-04.
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evidence from multiple trials and to be able to demonstrate a
racially discriminatory pattern." Thus, Swain identified a problem but provided no concrete remedy for it, since few blacks could
meet this tough evidentiary burden.
B. Batson and Its Successors
The Supreme Court overturned Swain's systematic exclusion
requirement in Batson.29 In Batson, the prosecutor used his four
peremptory challenges to strike all four blacks from the venire,
resulting in an all-white jury."0 The Court held that the Equal
Protection Clause guarantees the defendant that the state will
not exclude prospective jurors solely on account of race, and that
the state may not exclude prospective jurors "on the assumption
that black jurors as a group will be unable impartially to consider the State's case against a black defendant."31 Racial stereotypes were thus not sufficiently sound to justify race-based
strikes.
Departing from Swain, the Batson Court held that a defendant can make a prima facie showing of purposeful racial discrimination by relying solely on the facts surrounding jury selection in his individual trial." To do so, the defendant must prove
that the facts and relevant circumstances raise an inference that
the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge to exclude a
venireman on account of his race. Once the defendant makes this
showing, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to articulate a raceneutral explanation for the challenge. If the prosecution fails to
do so, the strike is not allowed, and the court must impanel the
prospective juror.3
In explaining its holding, the Supreme Court observed that
racial discrimination in jury selection harms the defendant, the
jurors, and the justice system in general:
Racial discrimination in selection of jurors harms not only
the accused whose life or liberty they are summoned to try.
Competence to serve as a juror ultimately depends on an assessment of individual qualifications and ability impartially
Id ("ITihe defendant must, to pose the issue, show the prosecutor's systematic use
of peremptory challenges against Negroes over a period of time.").
476 US 79 (1986).

Id at 83.
at 88-89.
SId at 95.

30

3' Id

m Id at 96-98.
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to consider evidence presented at a trial.... [Buy denying a
person participation in jury service on account of his race,
the State unconstitutionally discriminated against the excluded juror .... Selection procedures that purposefully
exclude black persons from juries undermine public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice.'
Notably, the Court in Batson did not offer any empirical support
for its conclusions that peremptory challenges based on race have
no merit and harm African-Americans. The Court also did not
address whether peremptory challenges of members of other
suspect classes were potentially unconstitutional as well.
Unlike the majority, the dissent in Batson did address the
case's possible extension to other groups traditionally afforded
protection under the Equal Protection Clause. The dissent argued
that the conventional equal protection principles used to justify
the Court's holding would theoretically apply just as well to exclusions based on religion, gender, age, and other grounds.3 5
During the next few years, the Court further defined the
scope of Batson. In Powers v Ohio, the Court held that a criminal
defendant could object to race-based exclusions of veniremen
even if the defendant were not of the same race as the excluded
veniremen." In Edmonson v Leesville Concrete Co., the Court
held that a private litigant in a civil case, like the prosecution in
a criminal case, could not use peremptory challenges to exclude
veniremen on account of their race. 7 And in Georgia v
McCollum, the Court ruled that the Equal Protection Clause
prohibited the defense as well as the prosecution from using
peremptory challenges to engage in purposeful racial discrimination.3"
Significantly, the Court in McCollum briefly shifted its focus
beyond race and suggested the impropriety of basing peremptory
challenges on religious grounds, thus foreshadowing the extension of Batson to other suspect classifications. In reaffirming its
rejection of peremptory challenges based on assumptions of racial
bias, the Court concluded: "In our heterogeneous society policy as
well as constitutional considerations militate against the divisive
assumption-as a per se rule-that justice in a court of law may

Id at 87 (citations omitted).
Id at 124 (Burger dissenting).
499 US 400, 416 (1991).
500 US 614, 627-28 (1991).
505 US 42, 48-56 (1992).
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turn upon the pigmentation of skin, the accident of birth, or the
39
choice of religion."
C. J.E.B. and Beyond
In J.E.B., the Supreme Court found that peremptory challenges based on gender also violate the Equal Protection
Clause. 0 J.E.B. involved a paternity and child-support suit. At
trial, the state used nine of its ten peremptory challenges to
remove nine of the ten potential male jurors, leading eventually
to an entirely female jury.4' The Supreme Court found that discriminatory assumptions based on stereotypical notions of gender
could not withstand heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, especially where the "discrimination serves to ratify
and perpetuate invidious, archaic, and overbroad stereotypes
about the relative abilities of men and women."4 2 That is, since
discrimination in jury selection did not "substantially further [ I
the State's legitimate interest in achieving a fair and impartial
trial," gender-based peremptory challenges violated the Equal
Protection Clause.'
In J.E.B., the Supreme Court analyzed gender-based peremptory challenges under an intermediate standard of review. 4" It indicated that although parties could freely exercise
peremptory challenges to remove from the venire any group or
class of individuals normally subject to rational basis review,
peremptory challenges against groups afforded heightened scrutiny were potentially unconstitutional.' In determining whether
gender-based peremptory challenges could survive heightened
scrutiny, the Court considered whether these challenges provided
"substantial aid to a litigant's efforts to secure a fair and impartial jury."' The Court found that even though there was some
statistical support for stereotypes based on gender, that support
alone could not justify the discriminatory use of peremptory chal-

'

Id at 59, quoting Ristaino v Ross, 424 US 589, 596 n 8 (1976) (emphasis added by

author).
40 114 S Ct 1419, 1422 (1994).
41

Id at 1421-22.

42

Id at 1422.

Id at 1425.
" That is, a standard more rigorous than rational basis review, but less exacting
than strict scrutiny. For a discussion of the various standards of review in Equal Protection Clause cases and the implications of each, see Gerald Gunther, ConstitutionalLaw
602-03 (Foundation 12th ed 1991).
' J.E.B., 114 S Ct at 1424-25, 1429.
4 Id at 1425-26.
4
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lenges.4' The Court declared that many of the same harms that
resulted from race-based peremptory challenges would follow
from gender-based peremptory challenges as well: by exercising
peremptory challenges based on gender stereotypes, state actors
would "ratify and reinforce prejudicial views of the relative abilities of men and women."' Concluding, the Court held that "the
Equal Protection Clause prohibits discrimination injury selection
[based] on the assumption that an individual will be biased in a
particular case for no reason other than the fact that the person
happens to be a woman or happens to be a man."49
Unlike the Batson Court, the J.E.B. Court- did offer some
empirical support for its conclusions that gender-based peremptory challenges were meritless, although the Court ultimately considered such research irrelevant to its constitutional analysis. 0
In his dissent, however, Justice Scalia noted an earlier case that
had found that "[clontrolled studies.., have concluded that
women bring to juries their own perspectives and values that
influence both jury deliberation and result."5 ' To Scalia, such
empirical support was relevant to the constitutional analysis.
Justice Scalia further asserted that the majority's reasoning
prohibited religion-based peremptory challenges as well as those
based on gender:
The Court says that the only important government interest
that could be served by peremptory strikes is "securing a fair
and impartial jury." It refuses to accept respondent's argument that these strikes further that interest by eliminating
a group (men) which may be partial to male defendants,
because it will not accept any argument based on "the very
stereotype the law condemns."... That places all peremptory strikes based on any group characteristic at risk,
since they can all be denominated "stereotypes."...
Even if the line of our later cases guaranteed by today's
decision limits the theoretically boundless Batson principle
to race, sex, and perhaps other classifications subject to

4' Id at 1427 n 11.
Id at 1427.
Id at 1430, citing Batson, 476 US at 97-98.
J.E.B., 114 S Ct at 1426-27 & n 11.
5, Id at 1436 (Scalia dissenting), quoting Taylor v Louisiana, 419 US 522, 532 n 12
(1975).
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heightened scrutiny (which presumably would include religious belief), much damage has been done.5"
In this passage, Justice Scalia presaged the possible prohibition
of religion-based peremptory challenges and set the stage for
what was soon to come.
The Supreme Court's most recent encounter with the peremptory challenge was its denial of certiorari in Davis," where
the Minnesota Supreme Court had held that religion-based peremptory challenges did not violate the Equal Protection
Clause." Although there was no majority opinion in the Court's
denial of certiorari, Justice Ginsburg wrote a concurring opinion
in which she focused on two factors that, she believed, distinguished religion from race and gender. First, she noted that religious affiliation is not as self-evident as race or gender.55 Second, she quoted the Minnesota Supreme Court's determination
that inquiry into the veniremen's religious beliefs was irrelevant
and therefore improper. 5
Justice Ginsburg's attempt to persuade the Court that there
was no need to assess the constitutionality of religion-based challenges is unconvincing. First, her argument that religion is not
self-evident (and therefore presumably will not become an issue
during voir dire) is problematic, since religion became an issue
during voir dire in Davis as well as in several other reported
cases.5' Her second argument, that inquiry into religion during
voir dire is improper, also fails, since litigants are generally free
to ask veniremen whatever questions they think will best enable
them to select the most favorable jury, and it is entirely possible
that a lawyer will think that a prospective juror who belongs to a
particular religion will somehow be biased against his case. In
any case, it is important to note that, although Justice Ginsburg
wrote in support of the denial of certiorari, she did not assess the
constitutionality of religion-based challenges under the Equal
Protection Clause or the Free Exercise Clause. Instead, she attempted to explain why assessing the constitutionality of religion-based peremptory challenges was unnecessary.
2
5

Id at 1438 (citations omitted) (emphasis added in final paragraph).
114 S Ct at 2120.

' Davis, 504 NW2d at 767, cert denied, 114 S Ct at 2120. The Minnesota Supreme

Court did not consider how religion-based challenges would fare under the Free Exercise
Clause.
114 S Ct.at 2121 (Ginsburg concurring).
Id.

, See Section H.D.
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Dissenting from the denial of certiorari, Justice Thomas
argued that since the Supreme Court's decision in J.E.B. extended the holding of Batson to gender, peremptory challenges
against religious groups should be scrutinized as well.58 Thomas
noted that the Minnesota Supreme Court based its decision on
the (he believed erroneous) assumption that Batson's equal protection analysis was confined to race-based peremptory strikes.
Given the Court's implication in J.E.B. that all peremptory
strikes against groups that receive heightened scrutiny are potentially unconstitutional, Thomas posited that there was no
principled reason for declining to apply Batson to religion-based
challenges.5 9 Thomas speculated that the Court's decision to
deny certiorari stemmed from an unwillingness to confront forthrightly the ramifications of the J.E.B. decision.6" He stated that
"[i]t has long been recognized by some members of the Court that
subjecting the peremptory strike to the rigors of equal protection
analysis may ultimately spell the doom of the strike altogether,
because the peremptory challenge is by nature 'an arbitrary and
capricious right.'"'" So, after Batson, J.E.B., and Davis, the religion-based peremptory challenge stands on thin-though not yet
broken--constitutional ice.
D. Religion-Based Peremptory Challenges in the Lower Courts
Lower courts have both upheld and rejected the extension of
Batson to religion-based peremptory challenges,62 but only the

Davis, 114 S Ct at 2121-22.
59 Id at 2122.
's
60

Id.

1 Id, quoting Batson, 476 US at 123, itself quoting Swain, 380 US at 219, in turn

quoting Lewis v United States, 146 US 370, 378 (1892).
See, for example, United States v Greer, 939 F2d 1076, 1085 (5th Cir 1991) (holding
that the defendants accused of vandalizing a temple could not constitutionally strike Jewish veniremen from the panel). But see Davis, 504 NW2d at 771 (upholding the exclusion
of a prospective juror based on religious affiliation); Casarez, 913 SW2d at 495-96 (same).
Courts have also held that some state constitutions forbid religion-based peremptory
challenges as well. See, for example, Joseph v State, 636 S2d 777, 781 (Fla Dist Ct App
1994) (peremptory strike of a potential juror executed solely because the juror was Jewish
violated the Florida constitution's guarantee of an impartial jury); State v Eason, 336 NC
730, 445 SE2d 917, 921-23 (1994), cert denied, 115 S Ct 764 (1995) (holding that North
Carolina constitution specifically prohibits exclusion from jury service on account of
religion, but that prohibition does not apply to exclusion on the basis of religious opposition to capital punishment); State v Levinson, 71 Hawaii 492, 795 P2d 845, 849-50 (1990)
(same for the Hawaii constitution); Commonwealth v Carleton, 36 Mass App 137, 629
NE2d 321, 325 (1994) (holding that religion-based peremptory challenges violate clause of
the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights guaranteeing defendants a jury of their peers);
People v Fudge, 7 Cal 4th 1075, 31 Cal Rptr 2d 321, 332 (1994), cert denied, 115 S Ct
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Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, in Casarez v State,6 3 has considered this issue in light of J.E.B. and its suggestion that all
peremptories against groups that receive heightened scrutiny
may be unconstitutional." The Casarez court, however, held
that all religion-based peremptory challenges were constitutional.65 The court reasoned that excluding a potential juror on the
basis of his religious affiliation was reasonable because a religion
is based upon a system of beliefs shared by all its members. To
hold that a venireman could not be excluded on account of his
religious preference was tantamount, the court thought, to holding that he could not be struck on account of his beliefs, an idea
that the court believed to be beyond the scope of Batson.6
The dissent was "astounded" by the lack of authority for the
majority's holding and disputed the majority's assumption that
the beliefs of a religion are held by all of its members.6 7 The dissent then argued that religion-based peremptory challenges did
not advance a compelling state interest and, therefore, should be
eliminated.6
The Casarez dissent accurately pointed out the crucial problem with the majority opinion: the absence of empirical data to
support the majority's tenuous conclusion that religion is an
accurate predictor of a juror's individually held beliefs and his
vote.6" One cannot just assume that, for example, the millions of
Catholics in this country are all opposed to birth control without
some data to support this conclusion.7" But because the Casarez
court based its opinion on these debatable assumptions about the

1367 (1995) (same for California constitution's guarantee of a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community). For more detailed analyses of the various constitutional prohibitions on religion-based peremptory challenges, see Angela J. Mason, Discrimination Based on Religious Affiliation: Another Nail in the Peremptory Challenge's
Coffin?, 29 Ga L Rev 493 (1995); Keith A. Ward, "The Only Thing in the Middle of the
Road is d Dead Skunk and a Yellow Stripe": Peremptory Challenges-Take 'em or Leave
'em, 26 Tex Tech L Rev 1361 (1995).
913 SW2d 468 (Tex Crim App 1995).
J.E.B., 114 S Ct at 1424-28. Consequently, pre-J.E.B. decisions such as Davis are
not that helpful in assessing the constitutionality of religion-based peremptories. The
Minnesota Supreme Court in Davis held that Batson did not extend to religion since racebased classifications were sufficiently distinguishable. Davis, 504 NW2d at 771. J.E.B.
puts Davis in severe doubt.
' Casarez, 913 SW2d at 495-96.
6Id
at 495.
' Id at 501-02, 506 n 18 (Baird dissenting).
6 Id at 506.
6 Id at 501-02.
70 See text accompanying notes 121-23.
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correlation between personal beliefs and religious affiliation, they
merit close scrutiny.
III. A CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR EXAMINING RELIGIoNBASED PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
This Section argues that courts must review religion-based
peremptory challenges under strict scrutiny and that, since they
are not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest,
such challenges violate both the Equal Protection Clause and the
Free Exercise Clause. Practitioners might think that religionbased peremptory challenges are a necessary tool in the selection
of a fair and unbiased jury, and are in fact narrowly tailored to
this end. However, social science data reveals that religion-based
peremptory challenges are unlikely to facilitate the exclusion of
biased veniremen, and such strikes therefore are not narrowly
tailored toward achieving the state's interest in fair trials. But
before scrutinizing the empirical research relevant to religionbased peremptory challenges, it is helpful to analyze precisely
why courts afford religion-based classifications strict scrutiny.
A. The Equal Protection Clause
A classification receives heightened scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause if it either burdens a "fundamental right" or
discriminates against a "suspect class."7 ' While it is undisputed
that a "fundamental right" is one guaranteed by the Constitution,7 2 such as the free exercise of religion," the Supreme
See Kadrmas v Dickinson Public Schools, 487 US 450, 457-58 (1988).
See, for example, Plyler v Doe, 457 US 202, 232 (1982) (Blackmun concurring)
(stating that "fundamental rights are those that 'explicitly or implicitly [are] guaranteed
by the Constitution'"), quoting San Antonio Independent School District v Rodriguez, 411
US 1, 33-34 (1973) (alteration in Plyler); City of Mobile v Bolden, 446 US 55, 113 (1980)
(Marshall dissenting) ("Under the Equal Protection Clause, if a classification 'impinges
upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution,... strict
judicial scrutiny' is required .... ."), quoting San Antonio Independent School District,411
US at 17.
" See, for example, Nguyen v Nguyen, 882 SW2d 176, 177 n 2 (Mo Ct App 1994)
(stating that fundamental rights for equal protection purposes include freedom of religion); Phan v Virginia, 806 F2d 516, 519-20 (4th Cir 1986) (holding that conditioning
receipt of a public benefit upon choice of religion unconstitutionally interferes with a
fundamental right under the Equal Protection Clause). Courts are often reluctant to make
this point, however, since they can reach the same result under the First Amendment.
See, for example, Sherbert v Verner, 374 US 398, 410 (1963) ("In view of the result we
have reached under the First and Fourteenth Amendments' guarantee of free exercise of
religion, we have no occasion to consider appellant's claim [under the Equal Protection
Clause].").
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Court has never articulated a precise test for determining which
groups should be regarded as "suspect." In addition to discussing
religion as a fundamental right, this Section will also discuss religion as a suspect class, arguing that religion-based peremptory
challenges merit strict scrutiny under both rationales.
The Supreme Court has been relatively consistent in regarding religious classifications as suspect under the Equal Protection
Clause,7 4 although the Court has not fully explained why it considers religion to be suspect. In general, the Court considers the
following factors to be persuasive indicators of a suspect classification: whether the group's defining characteristic is immutable;75 whether the group has suffered a history of discrimination;7" whether the group has been relegated to such a
position of political powerlessness that extraordinary protection
from the majoritarian political process is necessary;77 and
whether the group's defining characteristic affects its members'
ability to participate in or contribute to society.78
Although the Supreme Court did not consider how gender
fared under these factors in J.E.B. (probably since it was already
well settled that classifications based on gender were afforded
heightened scrutiny), the Court indicated that a classification of
individuals who had a "long and unfortunate" history of discrimination should receive heightened scrutiny. 79 By this same ratio-

"' See Burlington NorthernRailroadCo. v Ford, 504 US 648, 651 (1992) (stating that
a statute did not offend the Equal Protection Clause since it did not "classify along suspect lines like race or religion"); Larson v Valente, 456 US 228, 246 (1982) (ruling that a
law drawing distinctions on religious grounds must be strictly scrutinized); City of New
Orleans v Dukes, 427 US 297, 303 (1976) (stating that the rational basis test only applies
if statute does not draw upon "inherently suspect distinctions such as race, religion, or
alienage"); Oyler v Boles, 368 US 448, 456 (1962) (ruling that selective enforcement does
not pose Equal Protection Clause concerns unless explicitly based upon "an unjustifiable
standard such as... religion"). See also Davis, 114 S Ct at 2121 (Thomas dissenting)
("J.E.B. would seem to have extended Batson's equal protection analysis to all strikes
[against classifications that receive heightened scrutiny]-a category which presumably
would include classifications based on religion."), citing Larson, 456 US at 244-46.
n See, for example, Frontiero v Richardson,411 US 677, 686 (1973).
76 See, for example, id at 684.
7 See, for example, San Antonio Independent School District,411 US at 28.
7 See, for example, City ofCleburne v Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 US 432, 44244 (1985).
7 J.E.B., 114 S Ct at 1425 (concluding that gender-based classifications warrant
heightened scrutiny because of this country's long and unfortunate history of gender discrimination). Although the J.E.B. Court looked only to the history of discrimination
against women when it held gender-based challenges up to heightened scrutiny, some
courts have concluded that religion may warrant strict scrutiny because it is an immutable characteristic. See, for example, Galloway v Louisiana, 817 F2d 1154, 1159 (5th Cir
1987) (To establish an equal protection claim, "[a] plaintiff must show membership in
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nale, our nation's history of religious discrimination, especially in
the jury system, suggests that courts should review religionbased challenges under heightened scrutiny as well.
The history of religious persecution in England and America
that at least in part inspired the First Amendment no doubt
contributed to the development of the Court's now routine conclusion. o Indeed, the period that saw the early settlement of the
American colonies was marked by severe religious discrimination
in England, where most religious groups other than the Anglican
Church were repressed.8 '
Religious discrimination was pervasive in the colonies and
early states as well. One can find the "religious test oath" codified
in early state constitutions: in Georgia, South Carolina, and New
Hampshire, for example, only Protestants could serve as state
legislators.8 2 The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 guaranteed equal treatment only to those belonging to Christian denominations.8 3 In early colonial New England, Puritans statutorily banished Baptists and expelled or executed Quakers."4 And in Virginia, an Anglican colony, Baptists were horsewhipped and jailed
up until the Revolution, while Puritans and Catholics were expelled.85
Some of the colonies, however, responded to religious discrimination by adopting a policy of religious toleration that guar-

some group with inherited or immutable characteristics (e.g., race, gender, religion, or
national origin)... ."). Note, however, that these cases provide no indication of how the
courts arrived at the conclusion that religion is an immutable characteristic.
' See, for example, Murdock v Pennsylvania, 319 US 105, 115-17 (1943) (noting that
the First Amendment was aimed at "taxes on knowledge" and other hindrances to the
transmission of information used to persecute religious groups).
"i See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free
Exercise of Religion, 103 Harv L Rev 1410, 1421 (1990). For example, England forbade
Catholics from practicing their beliefs, imprisoned Baptist religious leaders, and barred
non-Anglicans from holding public office. Id.
' J. Suzanne Bell Chambers, Applying the Break: Religion and the Peremptory
Challenge, 70 Ind L J 569, 597 n 192 (1995). In Pennsylvania, the restriction was less
draconian. Still, legislators in that state had to declare: "I do believe in God, the creator
and governor of the universe, the rewarder of the good and the punisher of the wicked.
And I do acknowledge the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament to be given by Divine
inspiration." Arlin M. Adams and Charles J. Emmerich, A Nation Dedicated to Religious
Liberty: The ConstitutionalHeritage of the Religion Clauses 14 (Penn 1990), quoting Pa
Const of 1776, § 10. In Vermont, legislators had to make a similar declaration, with the
addition of "and own and profess the protestant religion." Adams and Emmerich, A Nation
Dedicated to Religious Liberty at 14 n 76, quoting Vt Const of 1777, ch II, § IX.
' Adams and Emmerich, A Nation Dedicated to Religious Liberty at 10 (cited in note
82).
, McConnell, 103 Harv L Rev at 1423 (cited in note 81).
8 Id.
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anteed "liberty of conscience. " " These policies are the predecessors of today's constitutional provisions guaranteeing freedom of
religion." The Framers of the United States Constitution incorporated substantial protections against religious discrimination into Article VI"8 and the First Amendment.8 9 Yet, even as
late as 1968, Maryland's constitution required state officials to
declare their belief in the existence of God.9"
Moreover, some states historically denied people of particular
religions the opportunity to serve as jurors. Until 1965, when the
Maryland Court of Appeals outlawed the practice, the Maryland
Declaration of Rights made a belief in God a prerequisite for jury
service.9 Other courts have avoided declaring religious qualifications for jury duty unconstitutional by interpreting state provisions that require jurors to take oaths to permit affirmations
instead.2 As these cases highlight, religious discrimination not
only has been a problem in our nation's history, it has also been
a problem specifically within our jury system.
In sum, since the Supreme Court considers religious classifications to be suspect and considers the free exercise of religion to
be a fundamental right, it seems inevitable that the Supreme
Court will subject religion-based classifications to strict scrutiny.
If religion-based classifications are afforded strict scrutiny, then a
proponent of religion-based peremptory challenges must prove
that such challenges promote a compelling state interest and are
narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. But before turning to
whether religion-based peremptory challenges meet this standard, it is important to note an additional basis for affording

Id at 1425-26.
Id at 1427-28.
Article VI forbids the use of religious tests to exclude citizens from "public trusts."
US Const, Art VI, cl 3. One might argue that the discriminatory classification of individuals based upon their religious beliefs that occurs when religion-based peremptory challenges are executed is such a prohibited religious test. However, no litigant has ever
pressed the issue in this way in the courts.
' McConnell, 103 Harv L Rev at 1515-16 (cited in note 81). See also Morton Borden,
Jews, Turks, and Infidels (North Carolina 1984) (charting the history of discrimination
against non-Christian citizens of the United States).
' Constitutional Convention of Maryland 1967-1968, Comparisonof PresentConstitution and Constitution Proposed by Convention 7 (Twentieth Century 1968), quoting Md
Const of 1867, Art 37.
91 See Schowgurow v State, 240 Md 121, 213 A2d 475, 478 (Md Ct App 1965) (holding
that the requirement of a belief in God to qualify as a juror violates the Fourteenth
Amendment). See also Md Const of 1867, Art 37.
' See, for example, Jones v State, 94 Nev 679, 585 P2d 1340, 1341 (1978) ("Where an
affirnation is permitted in lieu of an oath, a juror's freedom of religion is not violated.").
See also Chambers, 70 Ind L J at 599 n 204 (cited in note 82).
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religion-based classifications strict scrutiny: the Free Exercise
Clause.
B. The Free Exercise Clause93
Apart from the Equal Protection Clause, the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment provides an alternative ground
for holding that religion-based challenges merit strict scrutiny.
The Supreme Court has yet to consider peremptory challenges
under the First Amendment because it has never decided a case
in which peremptory challenges raised religious issues. However,
as a general rule, when a state actor denies a recipient an important state benefit because of his religious beliefs, the state infringes upon the recipient's right to the free exercise of religion,
and such actions are subject to strict scrutiny.94 Because the
Supreme Court has long considered jury service an important
benefit of citizenship, and because the Free Exercise Clause prohibits the state from denying such benefits because of religious
affiliation, there is yet another reason for finding that religionbased peremptory challenges should receive strict scrutiny.
The Supreme Court recently stated its view that jury service
is an important state benefit in Powers v Ohio:
The opportunity for ordinary citizens to participate in the
administration of justice has long been recognized as one of
the principal justifications for retaining the jury system.... It "affords ordinary citizens a valuable opportunity
to participate in a process of government, an experience
fostering, one hopes, a respect for law." Indeed, with the
exception of voting, for most citizens the honor and privilege
of jury duty is their most significant opportunity to participate in the democratic process.95

9 Although this Comment's discussion of the First Amendment is limited to the Free
Exercise Clause, some commentators have suggested that religion-based peremptory
strikes might also violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. See David
G. Hart and Russel D. Cawyer, Batson and Its Progeny Prohibit the Use of Peremptory
Challenges Based upon Disability and Religion: A Practitioner'sGuide for Requesting a
Civil Batson Hearing, 26 Tex Tech L Rev 109, 115 (1994) (arguing that when the state
allows a civil litigant to strike a juror because of his or her religious beliefs, the state is in
effect preferring one religion over another).
See text accompanying notes 96-105.
"
499 US at 406-07, quoting Duncan v Louisiana, 391 US 145, 187 (1968) (Harlan
dissenting).

1996]

Religion-Based Peremptory Challenges

1657

Although Powers involved a juror who was dismissed on account
of his race, the state-benefit analysis applies with equal force to
the case of a venireman dismissed on religious grounds.
The Supreme Court has strictly scrutinized and subsequently
struck down programs that forced people to choose between their
right to receive important state benefits and their right to religious freedom.96 In McDaniel v Paty, the Court struck down a
Tennessee constitutional provision that prohibited clergymen
from serving as delegates to the state's limited constitutional
convention on the ground that Tennessee's policy conditioned the
right of clergymen to the free exercise of their religion on the
surrender of their right to seek office.97 The government could
not "fence out" from politics people whom it regarded as
overinvolved in religion." Since Tennessee's policy singled people out because of their religion and withheld from them a state
benefit, the classification was strictly scrutinized and struck
down."
In addition to the right to seek elected office, the Court has
considered several cases involving the right to receive state unemployment compensation. The Supreme Court has generally
struck down any state statute that conditioned the receipt of
state unemployment benefits on the relinquishment of a religious
practice. In its first case on this issue, Sherbert v Verner, the
Supreme Court held that South Carolina could not constitutionally apply the eligibility provisions of its unemployment compensation statute so as to deny benefits to a Seventh-Day

'6 In addition, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA") provides that every
government rule that interferes with the free exercise of religion must satisfy the strict
scrutiny standard. RFRA was passed by Congress to overrule Employment Division v
Smith, which held that a law that is neutral and of general applicability need not be
justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of
burdening a particular religious practice. 494 US 872, 885 (1990). RFRA restored the
application of strict scrutiny to state programs that do not directly target religious beliefs
but indirectly restrain the free exercise of religion. See Hunt v Hunt, 162 Vt 423, 648 A2d
843, 853-54 (1994); S Rep No 103-111, 103d Cong, 1st Sess 2 (1993), reprinted in 1993
USCCAN 1892, 1893 (expressing congressional intent to overrule Smith through passage
of RFRA); HR Rep No 103-88, 103d Cong, 1st Sess 2 (same). RFRA therefore supports the
conclusions reached in Section II.
, 435 US 618, 626-29 (1978).
Id at 641 (Brennan concurring).
McDaniel, 435 US at 629. See also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v City of
Hialeah, 508 US 520, 546 (1993) (holding that when the government takes an action that
is not in fact neutral but rather is intended to interfere with particular conduct because
that conduct is dictated by a religious belief, the government action will undergo "the
most rigorous of scrutiny").
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Adventist.' 0 The plaintiff had been discharged by her original
employer because she would not work on Saturday, and she refused to take on new work because those jobs also required her to
work on Saturday. When she applied for unemployment compensation, the agency in charge of distributing benefits claimed that
she was0 ineligible for them since she had turned down "suitable
work."' '
The Court in Sherbert first addressed the issue of whether
South Carolina's policy burdened the plaintiff's right to the free
exercise of her religion. The Court held that the policy clearly
did, since the agency's ruling forced her to choose between following the precepts of her religion and collecting state benefits.' 2
The Court then considered whether some compelling state interest furthered by the South Carolina eligibility provisions justified
the substantial infringement of the plaintiff's First Amendment
rights. The Court found none, and it struck the policy down as
unconstitutional.'
In a later decision much in line with Sherbert, the Supreme
Court held:
Where the State conditions receipt of an important benefit
upon conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it
denies such a benefit because of conduct mandated by a religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an
adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs, a
burden upon religion exists. While the compulsion may be
indirect, the °4infringement upon free exercise is nonetheless
substantial.'
The Court went on to find that Indiana's denial of unemployment
compensation benefits to a Jehovah's Witness who had quit his
job because his religious beliefs forbade his participation in the
production of armaments violated his First Amendment
10 5
rights.
100 374 US 398, 410 (1963).

'0' Id at 399-401.
102 Id at 403-04.
103

Id at 406-09.

Thomas v Review Bd of the Indiana Empl Sec Div, 450 US 707, 717-18 (1981).
'05 Id at 718-19. See also Frazee v Illinois DepartmentofEmployment Security, 489 US
104

829, 833-35 (1989) (holding that the state's denial of unemployment benefits to a worker
who refused a position requiring him to work on Sundays violated the Free Exercise
Clause); Hobble v Unemployment Appeals Commission, 480 US 136, 146 (1987) (concluding that Florida's refusal to award benefits to a worker who would not work on her
Sabbath violated her Free Exercise Clause rights, since the state could not force the
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Like the Tennessee constitutional provision and the various
state welfare policies, peremptory challenges based on religion
single out and deny benefits to members of religious groups solely
on the basis of religious belief or status."6 Consequently, because they burden potential jurors' free exercise rights, courts
should subject religion-based peremptory challenges to strict
scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause.
C. Determining Whether Religion-Based Peremptory Challenges
Are Narrowly Tailored: Social-Scientific Data
The determination that religion-based peremptory challenges
receive strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause and the
Free Exercise Clause is only the first step in the constitutional
inquiry. So long as allowing religion-based peremptory challenges
constitutes a narrowly tailored means of furthering a compelling
state interest, it will be upheld even if a fundamental right or
suspect class is burdened. The Supreme Court has made it clear
that states have a compelling interest in ensuring the selection of
fair and impartial juries. °7 What remains at issue is whether
religion-based peremptory challenges are narrowly tailored to
further that admittedly compelling interest. By looking to empirical data for evidence that peremptory challenges based on
religion are effective tools for excluding biased veniremen, a
proponent of such challenges could seek to offer some support for
them. However, since there is little, if any, social-scientific support for the efficacy of religion-based peremptory challenges, the
enterprise would fail. In other words, religion-based peremptory
challenges are not narrowly tailored toward achieving a compelling state interest, and, consequently, they are unconstitutional.
The first thing to note is that the Supreme Court has indicated that religion-based peremptory challenges will only satisfy
strict scrutiny if there is strong evidence to support their effectiveness in enabling litigants to remove biased veniremen. In
J.E.B., the Supreme Court recognized that veniremen have an
equal protection right to be free from "group stereotypes rooted

plaintiff to choose between following her religion and receiving state benefits).
1" Although a prospective juror who is dismissed with a peremptory challenge techni-

cally does not choose between the receipt of a state benefit and his religion (because the
choice is made for him by the litigants in the case), a juror is still denied a fundamental
right of citizenship because of his professed choice of religion.
1- J.E.B., 114 S Ct at 1425.
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in, and reflective of, historical prejudice."' The J.E.B. Court
did note that one side in that case tried to offer some empirical
support for its claim that men and women have different attitudes about certain issues,0 9 but the Court concluded that a
small amount of statistical support for a stereotype will not by
itself justify the peremptory challenge:
Even if a measure of truth can be found in some of the gender stereotypes used to justify gender-based peremptory
challenges, that fact alone cannot support discrimination on
the basis of gender in jury selection. We have made abundantly clear in past cases that gender classifications that
rest on impermissible stereotypes violate the Equal Protection Clause, even when some statistical support can be conjured up for the generalization."
Essentially, the Supreme Court recognized that members of a
class may have common characteristics and may share a set of
common values but emphasized that this alone would not justify
the continuation of discriminatory stereotypes.
Based on this reasoning, one might think that the Supreme
Court would never consider findings from social science dispositive in determining if a peremptory challenge should survive
strict scrutiny. To the contrary, though, social science research is
crucial in resolving the debate over religion-based peremptory
challenges. While race and gender classifications are based upon
physical characteristics, religious classifications are based on
beliefs: members of a religion are united, if at all, by common
beliefs. Unlike striking a juror because of his physical characteristics, striking a juror because of his beliefs might not seem as
intuitively offensive and meritless. However, since the J.E.B.
Court specifically warned that a party defending a peremptory

18 Id at 1421.
9 Id at 1426 n 9.
10

Id at 1427 n 11 (citations omitted). Many of the studies that indicate that members

of the same religion are inclined to have some of the same political views also conclude
that members of racial and gender groups are as likely, if not more likely, to have the
same opinions on controversial issues. See, for example, Gallup Organization, Preferences
in Three-Way Trials, 3 Am Enter 92 (Sept/Oct 1992); Voter Research & Surveys,
EthnoculturalPatterns,4 Am Enter 92, 92-96 (Jan/Feb 1993); Jay Schulman, et al, Recipe
for a Jury, Psych Today 37, 37-44 (May 1973); Donald E. Vinson, Jury Trials: The Psychology of Winning Strategy 12-15 (Michie 1986); Jeffrey T. Frederick, The Psychology of
the American Jury 12-15 (Michie 1987). But since the Supreme Court barely considered
such data in J.E.B., it is entirely possible that they would also not consider it dispositive
in the religion context.
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challenge based on a stereotype about a suspect class would bear
a heavy burden, and that coming up with a small amount of
statistical support for the stereotype would not be enough to
satisfy this burden,"' a proponent of a religion-based peremptory challenge will need to provide a large amount of statistical data before that party will satisfy the strict scrutiny standard. Therefore, a proponent of a religion-based peremptory challenge would probably have to do more than merely provide evidence proving a correlation between religion and specific opinions
on discrete issues. This is apparent because the Supreme Court
rejected similar evidence in J.E.B.,' and because this type of
data does not necessarily prove how a juror would decide the
merits of a particular case.
What data there is to support the conclusion that members
of a given religion are inclined to reach similar outcomes when
placed on a jury panel is unpersuasive because the relevant studies have at most established that members of a religion may tend
to share similar ideological views on various issues;". the studies have not proved that religious affiliation is an indicator of
how members of a jury will decide the outcome of a trial, nor
have they established that members of any religion are less able
than nonmembers to reach an impartial verdict," as the Supreme Court would require a proponent of a religion-based peremptory challenge to do.
In the study most applicable to the jury selection process,
Religiousness, Religious Orientation,and Attitudes Towards Gays
and Lesbians, Randy Fisher and others surveyed members of the
Orlando, Florida, jury pool, purportedly to gather information to
"

J.E.B., 114 S Ct at 1427 n 11.

112

Id at 1425-27.

...See, for example, Margaret M. Bierly, Prejudice Toward Contemporary Outgroups
as a Generalized Attitude, 15 J Applied Soc Psych 189, 193 (1985) ("No differences were
found between Catholics, Protestants, or those with no religious affiliation in attitudes
toward homosexuals or women."); Douglas Lee Eckberg and T. Jean Blocker, Varieties of
Religious Involvement and Environmental Concerns: Testing the Lynn White Thesis, 28 J
Sci Stud Relig 509 (1989) (finding some statistical support for the hypothesis that the
disenchantment of nature in Genesis corresponds to reduced environmental concern
among Judeo-Christians as compared to other groups); Gallup Organization, 3 Am Enter
at 92 (cited in note 110); Voter Research & Surveys, 4 Am Enter at 92-96 (cited in note
110) (showing relatively small differences in voting patterns based on religion); Schulman,
et al, Psych Today at 40 (cited in note 110) ("We discovered... that religion was
significantly related to all the attitudes [including political views] that concerned us.").
.14Compare Cathy E. Bennet and Robert B. Hirschhorn, Bennet's Guide to Jury
Selection and Trial Dynamics in Civil and Criminal Litigation 261-62 (West 1993) (warning litigants not to rely on religious affiliation in using peremptory challenges, and advising instead that they ascertain the individual religious beliefs of potential jurors).

1662

The University of Chicago Law Review

[63:1639

be used in an upcoming trial." The supposed plaintiff, a former deputy sheriff and admitted homosexual, claimed he was
improperly fired from the sheriff's office because of his homosexuality. The surveyors wanted to assess how members of various
religions viewed the deputy's case, so they asked the respondents
whether they believed the plaintiff's or the defendant's version of
the events and whether the plaintiff was entitled to damages." 6
The authors found a strong correlation between religious preference and antigay attitudes: Baptists and fundamentalist Christians showed high levels of antigay attitudes, Catholics and Presbyterians showed low to moderate levels, and Jews showed the
lowest levels." ' Furthermore, antigay attitudes correlated with
a tendency to disbelieve the homosexual plaintiff."
While on the surface these findings may bolster litigants'
claims as to the validity of religion-based peremptory challenges,
there are two problems with this study. First, the ways the study
identified antigay prejudice were flawed. One of the five measures was whether respondents believed the plaintiff's or the
defendant's version of a crucial meeting, but believing the defendant sheriff's version could have indicated something other than
antigay feelings, such as respect for the police.
Second, and more important, responses to a thumbnail summary of the plaintiff's and defendant's versions of the events (the
format of the study) were poor proxies for actual jury voting
patterns. At a real trial, a juror might be swayed by his peers
during deliberations, the somber atmosphere of the courtroom, or
the effect of seeing a live plaintiff who may have been harmed in
ways not obvious from the brief sketch. At a real trial, whatever
political and moral predispositions a juror may have when he
enters the courtroom become one of the many elements that
ultimately influence his decision. The study, however, failed to
account for these factors. A truly persuasive study would have to
take place in a realistic setting. In any case, all that this study
proves is that a small "measure of truth" can be found in the
stereotypes about members of some religious groups and antigay
attitudes, and that religious affiliation can often be linked to
certain beliefs and opinions. This will not satisfy the burden that

" Randy D. Fisher, et al, Religiousness, Religious Orientation,and Attitudes Towards
Gays and Lesbians, 24 J Applied Soc Psych 614, 619 (1994).
116 Id.
11 Id at 623.
Id at 622.
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the Supreme Court places on a proponent of a religion-based
peremptory challenge." 9
In addition, stereotypes upon which litigants may rely in
exercising peremptory challenges may be inaccurate, because
members of a religion frequently do not share the same values
and beliefs and often do not adopt their church's official position
on controversial issues. As Robert Young concluded in his study
of people's positions on capital punishment: "religious orientation
is a highly complex phenomenon that supports a variety of seemingly contradictory attitudes and behaviors. " ' For example,
although the Roman Catholic Church forbids the use of artificial
birth control," 1 87 percent of American Catholics believe that
they should be allowed to use birth control.' This means that
if a litigant struck a Catholic venireman because the litigant
attributed to her the Catholic Church's condemnation of artificial
contraceptives, that litigant would face an 87 percent chance of
being wrong. Similarly, even though many people think Catholics
are staunchly opposed to abortion, nearly half the Catholics in
this country think that a woman should be able to have an abortion for economic reasons.' These studies thus indicate that
there is a wider variety of beliefs among members of the same
religion than people may assume. Therefore, there is some indication that when a practitioner strikes a venireman immediately
after hearing that the venireman is a member of some particular
religious group (before ascertaining in fact whether the venireman actually holds the belief the practitioner wants to eliminate
from the jury), that practitioner might be incorrect much of the
time.
Finally, even if a proponent of a religion-based peremptory
challenge were to provide a court with concrete empirical data
bearing out a correlation between religion and bias, the strikes
should still fail strict scrutiny, since there is no proof that litigants could effectively use this data. On this point, the study by

119
120

See J.E.B., 114 S Ct at 1427 n 11.
Robert L. Young, Religious Orientation,Race and Support for the Death Penalty,31

J Sci Stud Relig 76, 77 (1992).
121 Brenda Maddox, The Pope and Contraception: The DiabolicalDoctrine 29 (Chatto
& Windus 1991).
1' Patricia Edmonds, Rome wants obedience: Most U.S. Catholics disagree with
Vatican on issues, USA Today 3A, 3A (June 19, 1992).
" Election Profile: Catholics, 2 Am Enter 93, 93-98 (Sept/Oct 1991) (citing National
Opinion Research Center survey finding that 40 percent of American Catholics support
abortion for low-income families). This figure is only four points below the national
average. Id.
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Hans Zeisel and Shari Diamond questions the ability of lawyers
to detect jurors' biases and to predict how these biases will impact jurors' decisions in discrete cases.'
According to the
study, lawyers hardly improved their positions through the use of
their peremptory challenges, and they would have fared about
the same if they had eliminated jurors randomly.' This further suggests that religion-based peremptories are not narrowly
tailored to further the selection of a fair and unbiased jury.
But even if in theory religion-based peremptory challenges
could be useful, in practice they are not. Historically, trial experts often have based their assessments of jurors not on well
reasoned theories about religion, but rather on groundless and
stereotypical assumptions that often contradict each other. For
instance, as one celebrated commentator warned:
Presbyterians [are] as cold as the grave; [they] know[ ]
wrong from right, although [they] seldom find anything
right.... If possible, the Baptists are more hopeless than
the Presbyterians.... Methodists are worth considering;
they are nearer the soil.... As to Unitarians, Universalists,
Congregationalists, Jews and other agnostics, don't ask them
too many questions; keep them anyhow, especially Jews and
agnostics."6
Another text cautioned: "Ask veniremen their religious preference. Jewish veniremen generally make poor State's jurors. Jews
have a history of oppression and generally empathize with the
accused. Lutherans and Church of Christ veniremen usually
make good State's jurors." 7 In the medical malpractice context,
one commentator warned plaintiffs' lawyers to stay away from
Jewish jurors because "most Jews want their sons to become doctors,.., and they want their daughters to marry doctors."' On
the other hand, some trial advocacy writers think that questions
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about religion should be omitted altogether because they are not
at all helpful in predicting jurors' dispositions.'
Although knowledge of a juror's religious affiliation does not
significantly help a lawyer predict how the juror will decide a
case, the extent and intensity of the juror's religious involvement
and commitment to his particular religion may be helpful in
predicting his positions on controversial issues. In Robert L.
Young's study of the relationship between religious orientation
and attitudes toward the death penalty, he concluded that religious observance correlated strongly with opposition to the
death penalty."' 0 Similarly, Andrew Greely's study, Religion
and Attitudes Toward the Environment, concluded that the crucial predictor of environmental concern was the literalism of one's
belief in the Bible. 1 And the Fisher study, which found a correlation between antigay attitudes and membership in certain
religions, concluded that greater frequency or attendance at religious services is associated with greater prejudice toward
"' Given these studies, it makes sense to forbid challenges
gays. 32
based on religious affiliation in favor of a system that forces a
party to probe more deeply during voir dire into a potential

'
See, for instance, Judicial Conference of the United States, The Jury System in the
Federal Courts 28 (Inst of Jud Admin 1960) (concluding that questions on race and religion "might better be completely omitted" since they are unrevealing); John A. Appleman,
et al, Successful Jury Trials:A Symposium 128 (Bobbs-Merrill 1992) ("Unless questions of
religious beliefs are likely to be raised in the case ... one need not be too much concerned
about a juror's religious affiliations.").
1"0 Young, 31 J Sci Stud Relig at 85 (cited in note 120).
131 Andrew Greely, Religion and Attitudes Toward the Environment, 32 J Sci Stud

Relig 19, 22 (1993) ("Biblical literalism... correlates negatively with environmental
concern ..
").
'" Fisher, et al, 24 J Applied Soc Psych at 623 (cited in note 115). See also Harold G.
Grasmick, Carolyn Stout Morgan, and Mary Baldwin Kennedy, SupportforCorporalPunishment in the Schools: A Comparisonof the Effects of Socioeconomic Status and Religion, 73
Soc Sci Q 177, 182 (1992) (finding that fundamentalist Protestants are more supportive of
corporal punishment than nonfundamentalist Protestants); National Opinion Research Center, Religion and Politics, 1 Am Enter 101, 101 (Nov/Dec 1990) (finding that "increasingly,
it's the extent of religious involvement and commitment that is the key political variable"); Election Profile: Catholics, 2 Am Enter at 95 (cited in note 123) (finding that
Catholics who attend church frequently tend to be more conservative politically); Faith in
America, 5 Am Enter 90, 91 (Sept/Oct 1994) (reporting that more than half of Americans
attend church at least once a week); Bruce L. Vaughan, CourtroomPsychology and Jury
Selection 24 (Interstate College of Personology 1986) ("It is far more important to know
the degree of religious behavior rather than which faith the person belongs to."); Gobert
and Jordan, Jury Selection § 11.08 at 403-04 (cited in note 12) (stating that "it is important... to determine the strength of a juror's religious beliefs in order to gauge the
rigidity of that juror's concepts of right and wrong").
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juror's actual beliefs, the intensity of those beliefs, and his commitment to the teachings of his religion.
In sum, religion-based peremptory challenges fail strict scrutiny. Although practitioners may feel that they are an important
tool, the Court in J.E.B. implicitly held that religion-based
peremptories would fail to pass constitutional muster unless they
were narrowly tailored to achieve the goal of the selection of an
unbiased jury. While there may be evidence linking certain religious affiliations with certain beliefs and values, evidence of that
alone is unlikely to satisfy a court. Proving that some prospective
jurors come to the jury room with certain predilections and opinions does not prove that these jurors will be any less capable of
leaving their beliefs "at the door" of the jury deliberations room
and rendering a fair and impartial verdict. The only way a proponent of religion-based peremptory challenges could overcome this
hurdle is through the use of empirical data demonstrating that
members of any religion are less able to render impartial verdicts
or even that members of one religion are likely to come to certain
verdicts. Because no such data exists, and because there is no
proof that, even if the data existed, litigants could effectively
make use of it, religion-based peremptory challenges fail to survive strict scrutiny. Following the Court's analysis in J.E.B., the
rights of jurors to the free exercise of their religion and the equal
protection of the laws represent interests too compelling to maintain a system of unbridled use of religion-based peremptory challenges.
IV.

IMPLEMENTING A BAN ON RELIGION-BASED PEREMPTORY

CHALLENGES: THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN AFFILIATION-BASED
AND BELIEF-BASED CHALLENGES

Because of the amorphous nature of religion and religious
belief, determining which religion-based peremptory challenges
should be forbidden will be more difficult than making the same
determination about race-based and gender-based strikes. However, by drawing a firm line that forbids peremptory challenges
based on a prospective juror's religious affiliation but permits
challenges based on the prospective juror's beliefs, the legal system can preserve the peremptory challenges that ensure the
selection of a fair and impartial jury.
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A. The Mechanics of the Proposal
One can distinguish two kinds of religion-based peremptory
challenges. First, counsel might exercise a peremptory challenge
immediately after hearing that a prospective juror belonged to a
specific religion, without inquiring into the venireman's actual
beliefs. For example, a defense lawyer might immediately want
to strike someone who is Jewish if the defendant were charged
with the desecration of a temple. Second, counsel might ascertain
that a prospective juror belongs to a religion that she has found
through past experience to be biased, and might then continue to
inquire into his beliefs to determine whether he did indeed hold
an "objectionable" belief. For example, after finding out that a
venireman was a Jehovah's Witness, the lawyer might determine
through further questioning that the venireman believed that he
should refrain from exercising judgment over his fellow human
beings, in which case the lawyer would strike him." Under the
approach proposed in this Comment, the peremptory challenge
exercised in the first example would be unconstitutional, while
the peremptory challenge in the second example would be permissible.
Generally, a prohibition on affiliation-based peremptories
would not alter voir dire. Neither side would face greater restrictions on its right to ask questions about a venireman's religion
and religious beliefs."M If one party suspected that the other
had exercised an impermissible strike, the challenging attorney
could request an affiliation-neutral explanation. The burden
would then shift to the nonmoving party to articulate a neutral
explanation for dismissing the juror. If that party failed to do so,
the strike would not be allowed and the court would impanel the
juror.'
For example, suppose that a venireman was called to serve
in a criminal case in which the defendant was charged with the
failure to pay alimony and child support. The defense might ask
this prospective juror if he belonged to a religion that might
"influence his thinking." Suppose the juror answered yes, he
happened to be Catholic, and he "frowned" on any man who di-

u

See, for example, Davis, 504 NW2d at 768.

As previously noted, there is no constitutional right to inquire into prospective
jurors' religious beliefs during voir dire, so it is largely up to the judge's individual discretion if he will permit the parties to propose religion-based questions. See text accompanying note 24.
" This procedure was outlined by the Supreme Court in Batson, 476 US at 93-98.
"
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vorced his wife. The defense lawyer would first try to remove the
juror for cause. Assuming he failed in his attempt, he might
exercise a peremptory challenge. The state could then request an
affiliation-neutral explanation for the challenge. The burden
would then shift back to the defense, who would have to explain
that the prospective juror was struck not on the basis of his religion but rather on the basis of his personal bias against divorce.
Under this approach, it is irrelevant what motivates the juror's
bias, because-religion is treated like any other non-religious motivating factor.
If the other party suspected that the explanation for the
strike was pretextual and that the strike was in fact based on
the juror's religious affiliation, the court might hold a miniBatson hearing to make a fact-based determination as to what
the lawyer's motivations in striking the prospective juror really
were. As with race-based and gender-based claims, a party alleging affiliation-based discrimination would be required to make a
prima facie showing of intentional discrimination before the party exercising the strike would be required to explain the basis for
the strike. When an explanation is required, it need not rise to
the level of a challenge for cause. Instead, it must only be based
on a characteristic of the juror other than religious affiliation,
although it must not be merely a pretext for discrimination.'3 6
B. Why Belief-Based Challenges, as Opposed to Affiliation-Based
Challenges, Are Narrowly Tailored to Serve a Compelling State
Interest
Forbidding peremptory challenges based solely on stereotypical notions of religion is administratively straightforward and
almost surely constitutionally mandated. Justice Kennedy best
articulated the groundwork for this conclusion in J.E.B. when he
said that courts should not consider a potential juror as a representative of a racial, religious, or sexual group, but as an individual citizen.3 7 Strikes based on an inquiry into the venireman's
actual beliefs are not unconstitutional because the party executing the peremptory challenge bases the strike on a theory about
the juror's actual beliefs rather than on a stereotype about the
juror's religious affiliation.

" J.E.B., 114 S Ct at 1429-30.
. J.E.B., 114 S Ct at 1434 (Kennedy concurring).
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This proposed line also best comports with the social science
research. While no research supports the notion that members of
any religion are less capable of reaching fair and unbiased verdicts than members of any other religion, it is generally accepted
that the intensity of one's religious beliefs is an accurate predictor of one's views on many issues.'3 8 This means that, although
knowing a venireman's religion is not very helpful for predicting
his vote, knowing how religious the venireman is might be. Given
this discernible pattern in the statistical data on the intensity of
one's religious affiliation, the courts should adopt a regime that
encourages practitioners to probe more deeply into the individually-held beliefs and practices of prospective jurors in order to
ascertain how religious the prospective juror is and, therefore, to
predict which party he will favor. Although a party could not
remove, for example, a fundamentalist Baptist any more than a
party could remove an "ordinary" Baptist under the proposal, by
requiring both sides to probe a venireman's beliefs, a litigant
would be more likely to uncover some personally-held belief that
would support a constitutional peremptory challenge.
Furthermore, if peremptory challenges based on religious
beliefs were prohibited, parties opposing exclusion of a venireman
could argue that a virtually unlimited number of beliefs were
religious in order to defeat peremptory challenges. For example,
in a case in which a doctor is charged with violating a state law
prohibiting late-term abortions, counsel might well want to strike
a venireman who stated that he was Catholic and was opposed to
abortion, although he claimed that his opinion about abortion
had nothing to do with his religious convictions. Would the court
have to disallow the strike because it might be religious in nature, or allow it, since the man claimed that this opinion had
nothing to do with his religion? The difficulty is compounded by
the fact that the Supreme Court has never articulated a formal
definition of a "religious belief" or a "religion."" 9 If belief-based
challenges were forbidden, such difficult situations might well
become common, as the party opposing exclusion could almost always describe a belief as religious.
Finally, if peremptory challenges based on a juror's recitation
of his religious beliefs were disallowed, the legal system would be
stripped of its tools for removing religious extremists but not

See text accompanying notes 130-32.
John E. Nowak and Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law § 17.8 at 1218-33
(West 4th ed 1991).
'a
"
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nonreligious extremists. For example, a juror who said, "I can
walk on water," could be properly challenged, but a juror who
said, "I can walk on water because Jesus will lift me into the
air," would be stating her religious conviction and would be immune from peremptory challenges. Similarly, consider the case of
a juror who said that she could fairly consider the case against a
Jewish defendant, even though she hated all Jews because she
believed that they secretly own all the banks, control the universities, and are conspiring to take over the world. A litigant could
use a peremptory challenge to remove her, but not a similar juror
who hated all Jews because her religion taught that they killed
Jesus, since her motivations would be religious. By forbidding
only peremptory challenges exercised to remove jurors on the
basis of religious affiliation, while retaining challenges exercised
to remove jurors for particular beliefs they hold, the courts can
prevent such inconsistencies from becoming a problem during
voir dire.
C. Potential Pitfalls
One might doubt whether this solution would actually prevent practitioners from exercising affiliation-based peremptories.
For example, say that an Arab man charged with desecrating a
temple wanted to strike anyone who was Jewish, so his lawyer
asked each venireman about his religious beliefs. After one said
that he is Jewish, the lawyer asked if he believed in Christmas.
The man said no, and the lawyer struck him. Although this
would technically be a belief-based rather than an affiliationbased strike, a court should not allow the defense to exercise a
peremptory in this case. Since the defendant would be unable to
explain how the failure to celebrate Christmas could possibly be
relevant to the juror's ability to decide the case at hand, the
judge should treat the explanation for this strike as pretextual
and recognize that the strike was really an unconstitutional,
affiliation-based strike. Consequently, such strikes would be
disallowed under the proposal."4
1

One might question the trial court's ability to prevent the invention of pretextual

reasons. When a lawyer requests a religion-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge, it might seem that the other side could concoct a plausible, non-discriminatory
explanation with reference to subjective impressions. However, in practice courts have
been reluctant to let lawyers advance subjective impressions in response to a request for a
neutral explanation of a peremptory challenge. See, for example, Williams v State, 574
S2d 136, 137 (Fla 1991) (rejecting a peremptory challenge based on the claim that a
prospective juror could not understand the felony murder rule and further asserting that
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Other commentators have argued that no type of religionbased peremptory challenge should be forbidden because practically every peremptory challenge might be followed by a request
for a religion-neutral explanation, slowing down voir dire considerably." However, this concern is unfounded. In most cases,
there is no reason to suspect that litigants are seeking to eliminate jurors of any particular religion. If a juror's religion becomes
an issue during voir dire, both sides know to be on guard that
the other side may seek. to eliminate that juror. Moreover, a
judge can use his authority over voir dire to stop lawyers from
making frivolous, repeated requests for religion-neutral explanations for peremptory challenges.
Still other commentators have noted that jurors may not all
welcome a system that enhances questioning during voir dire. If
a court requires a party to strike a juror based on the juror's
personal beliefs rather than the juror's religious identity, the
party will have to probe more deeply into the juror's personal
beliefs and intrude on the juror's privacy to a greater degree.
Unfortunately, this result is unavoidable, and this Comment's
proposal is, in any case, preferable to a system in which jurors
are summarily dismissed and labeled unsuitable without regard
to their particular beliefs.
In sum, the problems of conducting voir dire in a system that
limits religion-based peremptory challenges are small compared
to the constitutional mandate this solution addresses. By forbidding affiliation-based peremptory challenges while retaining
belief-based peremptory challenges, courts can eliminate the
most invidious peremptory challenges that have little if any empirical support (such as those used to eliminate all Jews from the
panel in an anti-Semitism case, and those used to eliminate
Balhandra Das in Clemmons') while still preserving jurors'
rights to the equal protection of the laws and the free exercise of
their religion without disrupting the performance of the justice
system.

"the peremptory challenge is uniquely suited to masking discriminatory motives... and
thus must be vigilantly policed"); Floyd v State, 569 S2d 1225, 1229 (Fla 1990) (rejecting
explanation as pretextual upon discovering that prosecution's stated version of events at
voir dire was not supported by the record); American Security Insurance Co. v Hettel, 572
S2d 1020, 1020-21 (Fla Dist Ct App 1991) (holding that dislike of the manner in which a
juror answered counsel's questions and the juror's apparent disinterest in the case was
not a sufficiently clear and specific reason for the challenge).
1
See, for example, Chambers, 70 Ind L J at 587-612 (cited in note 82).
1
See text accompanying notes 1-3.
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CONCLUSION

When the Supreme Court decided J.E.B., it opened the door
for the eventual prohibition of religion-based peremptory challenges by stating that challenges exercised against groups afforded heightened scrutiny were potentially unconstitutional.' The
Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in Davis highlighted the
need for an assessment of the constitutionality of religion-based
peremptory challenges. Justice Thomas argued that it was necessary to resolve the issue by determining whether there was a
principled distinction between religion-based strikes and those
based on race or gender.'
This Comment answers Justice Thomas by concluding that
there is indeed no principled distinction between race, gender,
and religious affiliation. Religious classifications, like classifications based on race and gender, receive heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. Moreover, the First Amendment
requires that burdens on the free exercise of religion receive
strict scrutiny. Weighing the relevant compelling interests and
examining what statistical data supports litigants' exercise of
religion-based peremptory challenges, one must reach the same
conclusion with respect to religion-based peremptories that the
Supreme Court reached in J.E.B. with respect to gender-based
peremptories: religious affiliation-based challenges are unconstitutional.
In arriving at this conclusion, the legal system need not say
farewell to all peremptory challenges. First, however the debate
on religion-based peremptories is resolved, challenges against
groups not afforded heightened scrutiny are in little danger of
being declared unconstitutional, since the Supreme Court has
never indicated its intention to forbid peremptory challenges
exercised against other groups that receive only rational basis
review. Also, it is possible to maintain a workable system by
preserving religion-based challenges that are exercised on the
basis of a venireman's beliefs while simultaneously forbidding
religion-based peremptory strikes based on the venireman's recitation of his religious affiliation. By so holding, courts can draw a
clear line between permissible and impermissible challenges that
will prevent a slide down the proverbial slippery slope.'

4
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'

J.E.B., 114 S Ct at 1424.
Davis, 114 S Ct at 2122 (Thomas dissenting).
See text accompanying note 6.

